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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
“For more than a century the United States has been the preeminent 
practitioner of “forward presence” – employing naval forces away from its 
homeland to deter adversaries, to reassure allies and friends, and to shorten the 
time for crisis response”.1 The results of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have brought about many new questions 
regarding the requirement for Naval forward presence in the Persian Gulf. The 
end many of the missions for the Navy, including sanctions enforcement and 
Maritime Interdiction Operations, and flights to support Operation Southern 
Watch have left questions regarding the need for continuous naval presence in 
the Persian Gulf. Can other services with forward deployed bases in the region 
conduct missions centered on WMD counter-proliferation, and the Global War on 
Terrorism? Are there practical reasons to reduce naval deployment into the 
Persian Gulf? The National Security Strategy of the United States summons the 
military to “provide the President with a wider range of military options to 
discourage aggression or any form of coercion against the United States, our 
allies and our friends.2  The Navy’s response, the  Fleet Response Plan (FRP) as 
an attempt to change the way the Navy deploys to respond to today’s challenges 
and future operational commitments. FRP will change the Navy’s readiness 
posture and institutionalize the capability to surge when required for crisis 
response, while still meeting current global force presence requirements.3 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to estimate future Naval requirements in the 
Gulf by analyzing three historical models of Navy operations in the Middle East 
region over the last 30 years. These models will be used to examine the Navy’s 
                                            
1 Roger W. Barnett, “Naval Power For a New Century” Naval War College Review, Winter 
2002 
2 “The National Security Strategy of the United States” September 2002,  p. 30  
3 Admiral Robert J. Natter, “Creating a Surge Ready Force”, Naval Institute Proceedings, 
September 2003 
2 
ability to respond to factors effecting the security in the Gulf. Since assuming the 
role as “guardian of the Gulf” after the withdrawal of British forces in 1968, Naval 
force structure has changed significantly. Initially, U.S. naval forces in the region 
were negligible as the government chose to rely on the “Twin Pillars” of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia to provide security for the Gulf. This rationale quickly changed with 
the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Islamic Revolution. Naval forces were quickly 
deployed to the region in order to secure the flow of oil from the region, and to 
prevent the further spread of Islamic Fundamentalism. The Navy’s presence in 
the region remained moderate throughout the 1980’s providing security to 
shipping during Operation Earnest Will. The character of Naval presence in the 
Gulf would again change with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The Navy is again 
poised to examine forces structure in the Gulf in the aftermath of Operation 
Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.  
 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
“The U.S. Navy has been, and will probably remain, an ever-changing and 
highly operational force, with a bias toward forward deployment.”4 In order to 
determine a new Naval Strategy and plan for possible missions and force 
structure one must have an understanding of the factors that effect Naval 
Operations in the Middle East. This thesis provides two future scenarios 
regarding the security in the Persian Gulf and possible Naval responses. These 
scenarios are not meant to be predictive; however, they can provide boundaries 
of possible events. These scenarios can facilitate estimations on the appropriate 
level of forward naval presence required to meet future commitments.  
 
There are a number of issues that will have an effect on future Naval 
Operations in the Persian Gulf; the outcome of nation-building in Iraq, the status 
of Iran’s WMD program, advances toward ending the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT), and the perception of America and U.S. forces. Each of these issues 
are intertwined with another, for example, positives steps toward stability in Iraq 
                                            
4 Peter Swartz, “Sea Changes: Transforming U.S. Navy Deployment Strategy: 1775-2002”, 
Alexandria, VA, Center for Naval Analyses, July 31 2002, p. 127   
3 
could reduce the perception of the U.S. as a colonial power, which in turn could 
reduce the appeal of terrorist and Islamist extremist rhetoric.  That being said, no 
prediction of the future will be accurate so the Navy must be prepared for any 
action, positive or negative and be in position to respond accordingly.  
 
C. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II: Historical Analysis of Naval Presence in the Persian Gulf 
In order to make a determination of the Navy’s future in the Gulf, one must 
look at past events and the Navy’s responses. This chapter will introduce key 
historical events in the Persian Gulf that have effected the Navy over the past 30 
years. During this time frame, the presence of forward-deployed Naval forces has 
changed considerably. With the withdrawal of British forces “east of the Suez” the 
United States initially sought to maintain security in the Gulf by bolstering 
regional powers, the Twin Pillars”, Iran and Saudi Arabia, while maintaining a 
token naval presence. The unexpected events that followed, Islamic Revolution 
in Iran, Iraqi invasion of Iran and Kuwait and Operation Enduring and Iraqi 
Freedom, have bolstered U.S. Naval presence to unmatched and previously 
unimaginable numbers. These events have set the groundwork for today’s 
strategy and mission.  
 
Chapter III: Future Security in the Persian Gulf: A “Best Case” Scenario. 
This chapter will examine a series of assumptions that could lead to the 
reasonable likelihood of greater stability and security in the Persian Gulf. These 
assumptions include; the stability of a new Iraqi government, the threat reduction 
of Weapons of mass destruction, progress regarding the GWOT, and an 
improved image of America’s intentions in the region. Each of these factors could 
effect the need for naval presence in the Gulf.  
 
Chapter IV: Future Security in the Persian Gulf: A “Worse Case” Scenario. 
This chapter IV will consider possible future deterioration of conditions in 
the region and look at possible decisions regarding changing strategies, missions 
4 
and effects on force structure. This scenario will provide assumptions counter to 
the previous chapter in order to create a set of boundaries for the future. Issues 
considered are: the United States inability to create a viable government in Iraq, 
the provocative actions of Iran regarding their WMD and missile technology 
programs, the increase in the frequency and magnitude of terrorist attacks, as 
well as consequences of greater anti-American rhetoric. The impact of these 
events will drastically effect Naval requirements in the Gulf and effect the Navy’s 
ability to respond to threats outside the region. 
 
Chapter V:  Conclusion. 
So, what does the future hold? The most likely scenario – certainly the 
one easiest to envision -- is the one that manages to deploy a constant-credible 
presence in the region. The need for the Navy in the Persian Gulf has been a 
U.S. National Interests since the end of World War II, and will remain so into the 
next 20 yrs. Due to the constraints of sovereignty issues the Navy remains the 
best military asset in the region. Persistent carrier presence in the Gulf is 
required to maintain security, with additional surges of multiple carriers for critical 










II. U.S. NAVAL HISTORY IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
A. INTRODUCTION  
While the uncertainty of the future missions for the U.S. Navy in the 
Persian Gulf continues to be addressed at all levels of Naval and Defense 
leadership, the answer may lie in the past. The way to determine a better course 
is to look back at American policy toward the region, from President Nixon’s 
reliance on regional powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran, the twin pillars, to the 
Persian Gulf being described as an American Lake and a region occupied by 
U.S. forces. Naval forces present in the Persian Gulf have also shifted drastically; 
they have gone from a minimal presence used to “show the flag” and promote 
friendly relations with American allies to the greatest amount of firepower ever 
assembled in one region. By looking at the American policies and naval strategy 
in the Persian Gulf over the past 30 years, we can better assess the path to take 
and some of the obstacles that will need to be addressed in the future. 
 
Within the last 30 years, there have been a number of unpredictable 
events that have changed American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. The first 
was in 1968 with the British announcement that it could no longer uphold the 
responsibility for security east of the Suez. The reduction of forces in the Persian 
Gulf was not the only loss; intelligence, and knowledge was also lacking. 
Responsibility for security in the Persian Gulf was delegated to the regional 
powers in the Gulf. U.S. military presence in the region was minimal: however, 
Soviet naval forces deployed into the Gulf in sizeable numbers.  
 
The Carter Doctrine, first introduced in his State of the Union address in 
1979, was a response to growing turmoil in the region. This change in policy 
brought about a change in Naval Strategy. The implementation of Rapid 
Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) brought a larger naval presence into the 
6 
Gulf. This moderate presence continued through the Reagan years, and played a 
significant role in Operation Earnest Will.  
 
The next major event in the Persian Gulf was Iraq’s invasion into Kuwait 
leading to the Gulf War in 1991. The Gulf War brought about a new policy toward 
the Persian Gulf. America would be the protector of the Gulf and have a great 
influence throughout the region. Naval forces in the region also increased. The 
significance of protecting U.S. interests in the region and enforcing UN sanctions 
against Iraq required a substantial naval presence. The Fifth Fleet was 
established and U.S. aircraft carriers remained stationed in the Gulf throughout 
the 1990’s.  
 
The final events of consequence were Operation Enduring Freedom and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Another new chapter has been opened for U.S. Naval 
strategy. The policies and implications on naval strategy in the aftermath of 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have yet to be 
decided. However, by analyzing the recent past, policy and strategy options can 
be recommended or eliminated. 
 
B. THE EARLY YEARS, TWIN PILLARS AND DETENTE 
From the end of World War II, the U.S. realized the importance of free 
flowing oil to Western allies. The security of these national interests brought 
naval forces into the Persian Gulf as early as 1948, and some form of forward 
naval presence has been in the Gulf ever since. Commander Middle East Forces 
(COMIDEASTFOR) - operating from the British base in Bahrain - was 
established in 1949 primarily to provide intelligence, liaison with allied militaries, 
and conduct official diplomatic calls on civilian and military dignitaries, as well as 
to protect our interest in the region, and our willingness to assist them when 
needed.5 
                                            
5 Michael A. Palmer, “On Course to Desert Storm: the United States Navy and the Persian 
Gulf”, Washington, DC, Naval Historical Center, 1992, p. 39 
7 
 
While U.S. presence was minimal, the Royal Navy continued to provide 
substantial forces regularly assigned to the region throughout the 1950’s and into 
the 1960’s. British carriers routinely chopped into the Persian Gulf and British 
naval forces played a crucial role in defending Kuwait in 1961 when Iraq 
threatened to attack the newly established country. However, it soon became 
clear that the British were no longer able to maintain the responsibility of 
preserving security in the Gulf. In 1968, the British government announced its 
decision to withdraw British military forces from east of Suez including those 
contingents stationed in the Gulf. 6 
 
The effects of British withdrawal were twofold. First there was a 
tremendous loss of a huge reservoir of historical knowledge, political expertise 
and analytic ability on events in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula that 
previously had been available to COMIDEASTFOR. Additionally, the withdrawal 
of Royal Navy ships and the Royal Air Force removed the only available assets 
for maritime reconnaissance in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Prior to 
withdrawal, U.K. sources and analysts had contributed about 80% of the political 
intelligence on the Persian Gulf area available to COMIDEASTFOR.7  
 
The British withdrawal also caused a vacuum of power in the region. 
Concerned that the Soviets, already with some influence in the region, would 
expand their ‘circle of influence’ to the warm water ports and rich oil fields along 
the Persian Gulf, the U.S. gradually accepted the assumption that the Persian 
Gulf needed to remain friendly to the West. America, still deeply involved in 
Vietnam and leaning towards an isolationistic foreign policy, limited the Nixon 
administration from assuming the role of protector of the Gulf. Henry Kissinger, 
then Nixon’s National Security Adviser, wrote: 
                                            
6 W. Seth Carus, Barry McCoy, John R. Hafey, “From MIDEASTFOR to Fifth Fleet: Forward 
Naval Presence in Southwest Asia”, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria VA, 1996, p. 53 
7 Michael A. Palmer, “Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the 
Persian Gulf, 1833-1992”, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1999, p. 96. (note: originally from MEF 
Command History, 1971, August 29, 1972) 
8 
There was no possible way of assigning any American military 
force to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam War and its 
attendant trauma. Congress would have tolerated no such 
commitment; the public would not have supported it.8 
 
With these political constraints, the Nixon administration sought to reduce 
American foreign presence to maintain global security. Responsibility for regional 
security would be placed in the hands of the local powers. This change in policy, 
later called the “Nixon Doctrine” was announced in his State of the Union 
Address of January 22, 1970. President Nixon stated, 
Neither the defense nor the development of other nations can be 
exclusively or primarily an American undertaking.  
The nations of each part of the world should assume the primary 
responsibility for their own well-being; and they themselves should 
determine the terms of that well-being. 
We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments, but we shall reduce 
our involvement and our presence in other nations’ affairs.9  
 
The U.S. relied on the ‘twin pillars’ of Iran and Saudi Arabia for the 
security of the Persian Gulf. However, it was believed that the continuation of our 
modest naval presence at “Bahrain would contribute to the stability of the Persian 
Gulf… and that to withdraw MIDEASTFOR, especially when the British were 
leaving and the Soviet naval effort was increasing, would give the impression, 
already gaining ground in Arab circles, that Western interest was waning”.10 
 
For the U.S. Navy, the primary concern in this period was the growing 
presence of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean. While the U.S. sold arms to 
                                            
8 Palmer, “Guardians…” p. 87-8. (note: originally, from Henry Kissinger, White House Years, 
Boston and Toronto: Little Brown, 1979, p. 1264  
9 Ibid, p. 87 (note: originally from Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 
Richard M. Nixon, 1970. p. 9) 
10 Carus, “From MIDEASTFOR…”, p. 58 (note: Originally from U.S. Congress, House of 
Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East, U.S. Interests in 
and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf, p. 3) 
9 
Iran and Saudi Arabia in order to maintain stability in the region, Soviet naval 
forces deployed to the gulf with growing numbers and frequency to attempt to fill 
the void left by the British withdrawal.  In 1968 U.S. and Soviet naval forces were 
equal, yet by 1972 Soviet naval forces outnumbered Americans almost 6:1  
 
 
 Source: “Means of Measuring Naval Power with Special Reference to U.S. and Soviet 
Activities in the Indian Ocean,” prepared for the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, 12 May 1974, Washington, 1974, 93 Cong., 2d session., pp. 4-7. 
 
The Carter administration recognized that the oil in the Persian Gulf was 
vital to U.S. and Western economies and moved quickly to strengthen the 
American position in the region. “In mid-1977, Presidential Review Memorandum 
10 identified “the Persian Gulf as a vulnerable and vital region, to which military 
concern ought to be given”. Presidential Directive 18, signed by Carter on August 
24, 1977, called for the establishment of what would become the Rapid 
Deployment Force – a “deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility’ 
for global contingencies, particularly in the Persian Gulf region and Korea.”12 
 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stressed the importance of naval and 
tactical air forces and improved strategic mobility, assets that would give the 
United States the capability “to respond effectively and simultaneously to a 
                                            
11 Palmer, “On Course…”,  p. 76 
12 Palmer, “Guardians…”, p. 101, (note: Originally from Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Power and 
Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981”, New York: Farrar, Straus, 
Giroux, 1983. p. 177) 
Table 1.   U.S. and Soviet Ship-Days in the Indian Ocean, 1968-197311 
   
  
  1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
U.S. 1,688 1,315 1,246 1,337 1,435 2,154 
Soviet 1,760 3,668 3,579 3,804 8,007 8,543 
10 
relatively minor as well as a major military contingency”13. This foresight would 
prove prophetic in the years to come. 
 
C. REVOLUTION AND A NEW TARGET OF CONTAINMENT 
In 1979, a series of events occurred that would change the security, U.S. 
foreign policy and Naval Strategy and in the Persian Gulf. In January 1979, one 
of the pillars gave way - the Shah was overthrown and Iran fell into chaos. In 
November, Iranian mobs stormed the U.S. embassy in Teheran holding 66 
Americans hostage. In December, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan and 
established a new puppet government. On January 21, 1980, President Carter 
gave his State of the Union Address: 
 
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as 
an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, 
and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force. 14 
 
 It was at this point that the U.S. assumed primary responsibility for 
security in the Persian Gulf. From then on American forces would deploy 
regularly to the region to ensure the free flow of oil to the West. The implication of 
the Carter Doctrine continued through the Reagan administration. In contrast to 
the almost frenzied activity of 1979 and 1980, between 1981 and 1986, 
Washington paid relatively little attention to the Gulf. This appears to have 
reflected two considerations. First, there was little perceived need to change the 
policies set in place during the early days of the Reagan administration, which 
essentially followed the outlines of the Carter Doctrine. CENTCOM continued the 
efforts initiated by the RDJTF to enhance U.S. military capabilities for the region. 
Second, developments in the Iran-Iraq War rarely appeared to threaten U.S. 
                                            
13 Palmer, “Guardians…”, p. 101, (note: Originally from David A. Quinlan, The Role of the 
Marine Corps in Rapid Deployment Forces, Washington: National Defense University Press, 
1983, pp. 1-2) 
14 Ibid, p. 106 (note: originally taken from Carter State of the Union Address, January 23, 
1980, State Department, Basic Documents, 1977-1980, #253) 
11 
interests in the region. As a result, the Gulf was not a high priority for officials in 
Washington.15  
 
Though the Persian Gulf was on the political back burner, the period 1979-
1990 saw a transformation in the character of the naval commitment to the 
region. The size of the forces assigned to the area grew substantially, both in 
absolute strength and as a proportion of total forward-deployed naval forces. At 
times, especially during 1980-1981, operations in the region stretched the 
resources of the Navy to the limit.16  
 
In 1980, Carrier days in the Indian Ocean increased over five hundred 
percent. Carrier strength remained continuous throughout the 1980’s with the 
exception of 1986, while the U.S. conducted operations against Libya. The 
reason for the increase in naval strength was due to the efforts to protect neutral 
shipping in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war during most of the 1980’s. 
Early on, naval forces were not actively used to protect shipping. Their presence 
was merely to demonstrate U.S. resolve to keep the war from spreading through 
the region. However, it was not until late1986 that U.S. forces were called upon 
to escort ships from neutral ports through the Straits of Hormuz. The Iran-Iraq 
War brought a threat to shipping in the Persian Gulf as both sides attacked 
shipping bound to and from the other. The U.S. reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers to 
allow them to be escorted by naval vessels through the Gulf. The reflagging and 
naval convoys, know as Operation Earnest Will,  were only partially a means of 
protecting oil exports from the gulf, it was also a way to demonstrate Western 
resolve to Arab allied to counter Soviet involvement in the region.17  
 
                                            
15 Carus, “From MIDEASTFOR…”, pp. 87-8 (Originally from Crowe, The Line of Fire) 
16 Ibid, p. 97 
17 Martin S. Navias and E.R. Hooton, “Tanker Wars; The Assault on Merchant Shipping 
















1976 1,279 19 3 0.1 
1977 1,439 100 7 0.3 
1978 1,207 35 3 0.1 
1979 2,612 153 9 0.4 
1980 6,993 836 51 2.3 
1981 5,651 646 39 1.7 
1982 5,361 443 27 1.2 
1983 4,704 406 24 1.0 
1984 5,335 410 28 1.1 
1985 5,136 475 36 1.3 
1986 3,580 185 13 0.5 
1987 6,760 412 30 1.1 
1988 7,991 412 30 1.1 
Source: Derived from Adam Siegel, Karen Domabyl, and Barbara Lingberg, 
Deployment of U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers and Other Surface Ships, 1976-1988, 
Alexandria, VA, 1989, pp. 13, 15, 21, 26-27. 
 
No carriers were assigned to MIDEASTFOR during this period. Carriers 
were deployed to the Indian Ocean and the North Arabian Sea, operating under 
the control of Seventh Fleet. Before 1979, there had been some carrier visits to 
ports in the Gulf. The emergence of Iran as an adversary, however, changed the 
military climate in the Gulf. Iran dominated the Strait of Hormuz, creating 
perceived risks for carriers coming into or out of the Gulf. In addition, it was 
believed that it would be difficult to operate carriers in the constricted waters of 
the Gulf. To remain well out of air attack range, fleet policy dictated that carriers 
operate a minimum of 200 nautical miles away from the Iranian littoral.19  
 
                                            
18 Palmer, “On Course…”, p. 97 
19 Ibid, p. 105 




D. SOVIETS, SADDAM AND SANCTIONS  
The Bush administration entered offices expecting to devote little time and 
effort to the Gulf. 1990 brought about a new era of foreign policies and defense 
strategies. The fall of the Soviet Union brought about the end of the “bipolar” 
international system and the U.S. was the sole global superpower. The Cold War 
was over and the Bush administration set about implementing a “peace-time” 
strategy to preserve global security. As Secretary of State James Baker noted, 
“Like almost everybody else. I assumed that with Iraq and Iran would be 
exhausted and impoverished from their decade-long war, the Persian Gulf would 
be relatively quiet”.20  
 
During this quiet period, the U.S. gradually reduced its forces in the 
region. By the summer of 1990, only five naval vessels patrolled the gulf, the 
smallest contingent since the late 1970’s. However, forward deployed forces 
would still remain a viable source toward deterrence and the preservation of 
regional stability. Bush’s new strategy regarding forward presence was,  
 
Peacetime forward presence will remain a key element of U.S. 
strategy, albeit at somewhat reduced levels, consistent with 
changing threats. Forces to forward presence are essential for 
strong security alliances. Forward-deployed forces play a critical 
role in deterring aggression, preserving regional stability and 
protecting U.S. interests. They are visible evidence of U.S. 
commitment and provide our initial capability for crisis response 
and escalation control.21  
 
The perceived peace of the early 1990’s was shaken by the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s rash move showed how unpredictable the 
security in the Persian Gulf was. The idea of Saddam controlling the vast oil 
                                            
20 Ibid, p. 92 (Originally from: James A. Baker III, with Thomas M. DeFrank, “The Politics of 
Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992”, New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995, p. 
43) 
21 Carus, “From MIDEASTFOR …”, p. 93 (Originally from: Vice President Dick Cheney, 
Annual Report, January 1991, p. 4) 
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riches of the Northern Gulf sent shockwaves throughout the Western world. The 
President told the American people:  
Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of 
friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the 
world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of that one man, 
Saddam Hussein.”22  
 
During the commencement of the assault the Middle East Force consisted 
of the smallest naval contingency in decades. Hours later, the Independence 
battle group steamed into the Northern Arabian Sea and arrived on station in the 
Gulf of Oman within days. The Eisenhower battle groups headed en route for the 
Suez canal. Within days of the invasion of Kuwait, carrier aircraft were in range to 
help defend the Arabian Peninsula. Theses forces would be the first assigned for 
“Desert Shield”.  
 
While the fleet’s presence in the region did not deter Saddam’s attack on 
Kuwait, it did make it clear to the Iraqi dictator that further advances could cost 
him dearly. In hindsight, Saddam probably had no intention of invading Saudi 
Arabia, but the inveterate risk-taker might have launched such an attack if 
powerful U.S. naval and air forces were not close at hand.23 
 
The Persian Gulf War marked the opening of a new chapter in the history 
of the United States Navy. In January 1991, Vice Admiral Stanley “Stan” Arthur, 
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, equipped with six aircraft 
carriers, two battleships and numerous other surface combatants, led the largest 
armada since World War II.24 For the first time in thirty years, carriers transited 
                                            
22 Edward J. Mardola and Robert J. Schneller Jr., “Shield and Sword: The United States 
Navy and the Persian Gulf War”, Washington, Naval Historical Center, 1998, p. 54 (Originally 
from: George Bush, Remarks to Department of Defense Employees, Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents 26, 20 August 1990, p. 1256) 
23 Edward J. Mardola, “The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf”, Naval Historical 
Center 
24 Marvin Pokrant, “Desert Shield at Sea: What the Navy Really Did”, Westport, CT, 
Greenwood Press, 1999, p.3 
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through the Straits of Hormuz and into the Persian Gulf. Hundreds of Tomahawk 
cruise missiles and carrier-based aircraft would strike strategic targets deep in 
Iraqi territory. Thousands of Marines were deployed to play a key role in the initial 
assault, focusing the attention of the Iraqis while coalition ground forces crossed 
the desert and trapped a large portion of the Iraqi Army.  
 
By the end of the Gulf War, the U.S. had an exceptional number of naval 
forces in the Persian Gulf. These forces were maintained throughout much of the 
1990’s. The Clinton administration entered office planning to continue its 
predecessor’s policies in the Gulf. One significant change in policy, “dual 
containment”, would take a stronger approach in supporting arms sales to Gulf 
states while containing Iraq and Iran. 
In pursuing that balance, the U.S. concentrates on two sets of key 
objectives: limiting the ability of both Iran and Iraq to threaten 
regional stability and bolstering the defensive capabilities of our 
friends in the region – individually, in tandem with their regional 
partners, and in concert with the U.S. and other friendly outside 
powers.25 
 
With American’s setting a high priority on security in the Persian Gulf, the 
policy of “dual containment” was not evenly directed at Iran and Iraq.  Saddam 
continued to rattle his saber and threaten other gulf states. U.S. naval forces 
were called on to curb his behavior. In addition, UN resolutions against Saddam’s 
regime allowed for a stronger hand toward Iraq. U.S and coalition naval forces 
also were responsible for enforcing UN imposed economic sanctions against 
Iraq. Surface combatants patrolled the Northern Gulf making it difficult for 
Saddam to traffic oil for war materials. 
 
Another reason for the sustained naval presence was the responsibility for 
enforcing UN humanitarian efforts in Southern and Northern Iraq (no-fly zones). 
                                            
25 Carus, “From MIDEASTFOR…”, p. 120 (Originally from: Toni G. Verstandig, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Principal Elements of U.S. 
Policy in the Persian Gulf, address to the National Security Industrial Association, Washington, 
DC, 22 March 1994 
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Operations Northern and Southern Watch required carrier-based aircraft to patrol 
the skies above Iraq to prevent Saddam from further atrocities against the Kurds 
to the north and Shiite in the South.  
 
The Clinton administration’s policy reinforced interaction with coalition 
forces and also encouraged greater interaction with U.S. forces and those of the 
Gulf States.  The “over the horizon” presence of the navy was no longer 
necessary. Gulf countries openly sought overt operations with U.S. and 
supported a larger “footprint” (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait).26 
 
D. CONCLUSION: OIF, GWOT AND THE NEW MILLENNIA 
The Global war on Terrorism, the fall of Iraq and the capture of Saddam 
Hussein bring about a new perspective on America’s responsibility, and forces 
necessary for the security of the Persian Gulf. If history shows us anything it is 
that, the instability in the region makes predicting the future difficult if not 
impossible.  Equally as difficult is attempting to prescribe a strategy to protect 
American interests and promote security.  
 
The unpredictability of critical events in the Persian Gulf makes policy 
planning problematic. Policy makers need to analyze past strategies to determine 
if they were successful, and how to amend them to make them applicable to 
today’s environment.  Will domestic pressure to limit forward deployed forces 
reduce naval presence similar to that of the 1960-1970’s? Will moderate, pre-
Gulf War forces be required to maintain security in the region? Alternatively, will 
the constant carrier presence of the post-Gulf War period provide the answer for 





                                            
26 Ibid, p 131 
17 
III. FUTURE SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF: A BEST-CASE 
SCENARIO 
March 25, 2024: 
 
USS HALSEY (DDG 97) gets underway from the Kuwaiti 
port of al-Shuaiba. HALSEY returns to the Northern Gulf to 
continue VIGILANT MARINER, a joint exercise with Iran, Kuwait, 
U.S., British and Australian Navies. Iraqi Naval attaches are on 
board the newly commissioned USS MC CAIN (DD 5). Iraqi officials 
are participating in the exercise while waiting for the final phase of 
their acquisition of a former U.S. Frigate (FFG 43) to be delivered 
early 2025. The purpose of VIGILANT MARINER is incorporate 
coalition navies into coordinated ASW and MIW, a L.A class 
Submarine is operating in the Northern Gulf simulating a Chinese 
093 armed with “Rocket torpedoes” and SSN-22’s.  
USS REAGAN and its CSG are operating in the central Gulf. 
Intelligence sources operating with Iraqi Special forces send 
targeting information on a known terrorist camp posing as Bedouins 
in the desert along the Iraq/Jordan border. Cruise missiles 
launched from CSG assets loiter unobtrusively above the target 
until the friendly forces have dispersed. Another L.A submarine is 
positioned off the coast of Iran conducting Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) monitoring a Chinese 
Frigate in port at Bushehr.  
Outside of FIFTH FLEET Headquarters, Bahrain, a man is 
stopped at the gate by Bahraini and U.S. soldiers. He attempts to 
detonate a bomb attached around his waist, however, U.S. forces 
disable the would be attacker and his bomb with a short EM pulse. 
Bahraini forces take the assailant into custody to be tried by the 
local authority. This is only the fifth attempted attack on U.S. forces 
in the Middle East this year due mainly to the exhaustion of popular 
support for terrorist attacks.   
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The account described above presents a “best case” scenario for security 
in the Persian Gulf in 2024. It provides a realistic expectation of what could 
happen under certain sets of assumptions that could produce more stability and 
security in the region. It takes into account many different factors in the Gulf that 
need to be considered. The stability of the new Iraqi government also has a 
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drastic effect on the course of the entire Gulf. Weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) proliferation and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) are key factors for 
security and stability in the region. These factors along with U.S. policy and the 
view of American military forces will determine the mission and purpose of Naval 
Forces in the Persian Gulf. These challenges to the security in the Gulf are 
interrelated and cannot be addressed in isolation from each other. A positive 
outcome from one factor could create momentum for further advances.  
 
B. IRAQ 
Iraq poses the biggest questions regarding security in the Persian Gulf. 
Since he came to power, Saddam Hussein had been a major factor in U.S. policy 
and military strategy in the Persian Gulf. During his early regime, the United 
States supported Saddam in order to contain the Soviet Union and later during 
an eight-year war with Iran. His standing soon changed once the war was over 
and Saddam chose to immediately by an unexpected attack and invasion of 
Kuwait. . He displayed further brutality by using chemical weapons on his own 
people (Kurds and Shiite) in order to show his supremacy. These events led the 
United States to view Saddam as a serious threat to U.S. interests in the Persian 
Gulf and overall Gulf security. However his perseverance was unmatched as he 
reigned through two major wars, and 12 years of UN sanctions. His resilience 
over the course of a 30 year reign naturally led to the assumption that he, or his 
sons, would continue to rule Iraq through the next generation. The most likely 
scenario for Iraq in 2015 is “if alive he (Saddam) would probably be ruling in 
tandem with his son, Qusay, already designated as the prime candidate to 
succeed Saddam”.27  
 
With Saddam’s regime out of power, the fate of Iraq is in the hands of its 
population (or up for grabs). Though U.S. policy advocates democracy, the 
overriding security issues in the Persian Gulf, hinges on the success of Iraq to 
sustain a legitimate, stable government capable of maintaining internal security. 
                                            
27 Judith S. Yaphe, “The Middle East in 2015: The Impact of Regional Trends on U.S. 
Strategic Planning”, Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, July 2002, p. 225 
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In any scenario concerning Iraq, it is important to understand that Iraq’s future is 
dependent on Iraqi’s helping themselves on their own terms. The Iraqi 
government must allow for political representation and accountability to the 
public. Large-scale economic reforms must also be taken in order to revitalize the 
work force and create jobs. These reforms can be supervised by U.S. and/or UN 
advisors to ensure fairness and to bolster the need for open dialogue without the 
fear of violence toward opposing parties. The U.S. and UN must create and 
environment where political and military aid is seen as acting in Iraq’s national 
interest and for the benefit of the Iraqi people.  
 
The Navy will have a limited role in a stable Iraqi scenario. Naval forces 
will play a part in the joint forces used to assist Iraq. The Navy might also be 
used to train an Iraqi Navy. The Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship could be used 
in exercises to build confidence and interaction between the United States and 
the Gulf States. Naval forces will also be required to guarantee access to key 
Iraqi port facilities for the Iraqi economy and to maintain the availability for 
American forces if required. These missions will include Anti-terrorism and Force 
Protection (AT/FP) as well as ASW and MIW.  
 
C. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
The biggest threat of WMD proliferation left in the Persian Gulf is Iran 
WMD proliferation in Iran could diminish; however, it would not be realistic to 
assume that states in the region would halt all production and procurement of 
WMD in the future. Nor is there any way “way to predict or know the scale of 
efforts being undertaken by key threats and other major regional actors, along 
with the difficulty in determining their capabilities in given types of weapons, and 
in characterizing the risk which these weapons present”.28 However, an 
argument could be made that certain factors could cause a reduction in the pace 
at which they are seeking to gain WMD.  
                                            
28 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional 
Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options and Weapons Effects”, 
Washington D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 15, 2003, p. 3 
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A number of factors could possibly reduce WMD proliferation in Iran. The 
fall of Iraq has put Iran’s leadership in a curious dilemma. The fall of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq has removed much of the original strategic motivation 
for acquiring nuclear weapons for Tehran. However, the current strategic rational, 
and now acts as a way to deter the United States from creating a fate for the 
Iranian government similar to that of Hussein’s regime.29 
 
While there is still considerable debate regarding the impetus for Iran’s 
WMD program, most analysts agree that a moderate regime with open economic 
ties to the West would be more likely to adhere to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and additional protocols and provide for greater transparency regarding their 
civilian nuclear power plants. Security assurances from the U.S. and UN, coupled 
with a moderate Iranian regime more accountable to the population would open 
the door for debate regarding their WMD program and the distinctions between 
“Iran’s legitimate security needs and nuclear weapons that are illegitimate as well 
as the regimes need to uphold NPT obligations… to assure its own security”.30 
 
Reducing the ability of regimes in the region to acquire WMD also could 
prove effective in reducing proliferation. However, the most exasperating aspect 
of dealing with suppliers is that “the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council are the largest suppliers of weapons to the region”.31 Even with the 
cooperation of these countries, the fact that technology and knowledge are easily 
attainable and nearly impossible to regulate makes WMD regulation difficult.  
 
The Navy’s ability to deter states from WMD proliferation is limited at best. 
However, it will still be necessary to have the capability to conduct counter-
                                            
29 Brenda Shaffer, “Iran at Nuclear threshold” Arms Control Today (November 2003), p. 2 
30 Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwak, “Debating Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations”, The 
Washington Quarterly 26, no 4 (Autumn 2003), p. 112 
31 Thomas A. Bowditch, “An American Middle East Policy For a New Century: Is It Time For 
a Change?”, Persian Gulf Beyond Desert Storm: U.S. Interest in a Multipolar World, Northfield 
Vermont, Norwich University, May 1993, p. 148 
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proliferation strikes as well as Ballistic Missile Defense. In an environment 
previously described these missions may have less importance. Nevertheless, 
supplier issues and covert proliferation will continue. Naval forces will remain key 
assets in intercepting WMD technology with Maritime Interdiction Operations 
(MIO) and Leadership Interception Operations (LIO). These missions are not new 
to naval forces operating in the Gulf and will work to limit states’ abilities to import 
WMD technology and hardware.  
 
D. GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 
The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war 
in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly 
elusive enemy over an extended period of time32 
 
With the uncertainty of terrorism, it would not be practical to claim that 
terrorism will be completely eradicated within the next twenty years or ever. Yet, 
if certain measures were taken, support for terrorism and acts of terrorism could 
subside. U.S. military action alone will not put an end to terrorism, however a 
number of other aspects could reduce terrorism in the region by either 
addressing the motivation for terrorism in the Middle East, or by limiting the 
targets (Americans and allies) operating in the Persian Gulf.  
 
Terrorists rely on the support of the people for recruiting, sustenance and 
concealment. States on the other hand, support terrorist groups for reasons of 
political expediency and to suit policy goals.33 In order to take real steps toward 
ending terrorism, the United States must involve allies and regional powers to 
convey the idea that political sponsorship of terrorism is not in the best interest of 
any state. America must assist states in eradicating terrorist infrastructure, and 
financial support. The U.S. must also reach out to the Muslim population as a 
whole and express the need to end the support and concealment of terrorists. 
                                            
32 “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, September 2002, p. 5  
33 James D. Kiras, “Terrorism and Irregular Warfare”, Strategy in the Contemporary World, 
New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 2002, p. 217 
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The gradual process of attrition requires a significant and consistent investment 
in time and resources and the political will to sustain the struggle.  
 
Even if significant strides are made toward ending terrorism, the Navy will 
play a vital role in continuing to pressure remaining terrorist organizations and 
their supporters. As terrorist organizations become more dispersed, the ability to 
strike them at a moments notice becomes more critical. The strategic 
significance of these strikes calls for them to be conducted with complete 
surprise. Launching land based aircraft could offer precursory notice to potential 
targets. Carrier based aircraft and seaborne missiles platforms could be 
launched with little notification and give no indications of U.S. intentions. 
 
E. U.S. IDENTITY IN THE GULF 
The perception of U.S. forces, and policy in the region could improve. It is 
unlikely that these populations will ever embrace America as a friend; however 
they could have a better perception of American assistance and interests. The 
perception of American forces fundamentally affects all other aspects of security 
in the Gulf. A warming of American and Muslim relations could lessen the 
intensity of Anti-American inflammatory remarks and protests.  This could lead to 
greater economic opportunities for international trade, and lessen the need for 
Gulf States to pursue trade with other countries through backdoors and under 
secrecy.  
 
How U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf evolves will affect naval strategy as 
much as anything else.  The steps that America takes today have a substantial 
impact on security and stability in the Persian Gulf than at any other time in 
history. American foreign policy in a stable Persian Gulf would need to balance a 
continued push for economic and political reforms while maintaining stability and 
security throughout the Gulf. It would also need to engage the international 
community to insure the security of the region while calling for staunch 
adherence to NPT and other treaties to limit WMD proliferation in the region. 
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Finally, American will need to seriously and fairly address the Arab-Israeli peace-
process in order to demonstrate American interests are better served through a 
peaceful resolution.  
  
The Navy has historically provided the Gulf States with an over-the-
horizon presence to insure security in the Gulf. The ability of the Navy to provide 
security while maintaining a small U.S. ‘footprint’ is a capability that will continue 
in the future. Naval presence is an important element in continuing to build and 
maintain strong relations with Gulf States. Naval Exercises assist in training and 
multinational cooperation amongst these states as well as provide assurance of 
United States commitment to Gulf security.  
 
F. CONCLUSION: NAVAL RESPONSE  
For this scenario, only a minimal military presence to include forward 
deployed naval units would be required. While force structure may change, the 
missions and purpose of the Navy will remain constant; guarantee regional 
access, exert national influence, and provide the ability to rapidly scale forces 
required to exploit the asymmetric advantage afforded by sea superiority.34 
 
Naval forces would act as a pillar in the Joint and coalition forces 
cooperating in the region to provide for over-arching security in the Gulf. After 
decades of deployments to the region, the Navy and Marine Corps are “familiar 
with the operating area and they give the Joint Force a knowledge advantage”.35 
The dependence on the West and to a greater extent Asia, for oil will only 
intensify with time. By 2024, world oil demand is projected to be roughly 120 
million barrels a day.36 In order to preserve the security of free-market 
economies, the United States must continue to guarantee the free-flow of oil from 
the Persian Gulf.  
                                            
34 “Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations” April 2003, p.1 
35 Ibid, p. 22 




The presence of naval units also reassures regional friendships and allies 
and continues partnerships with global allies. “The presence of American forces 
overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitment to allies 
and friends”.37 Naval port visits can also have an impact on regional security, and 
economies while limiting the American “footprint” that most countries in the 
region look to avoid. 38 
 
As U.S. forces become more integrated, they will also become more 
reliant on each other for intelligence and infrastructure vital for crisis 
management. “Penetrating and persistent intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) will be obtained through the use of organic… unmanned 
and autonomous stealthy sensors that are located from the seabed to space and 
are fully integrated and networked with reconnaissance forces, manned platforms 
and maneuver elements”.39 Although the scenario presented in this chapter 
paints a fairly optimistic view of future security in the Gulf, there must always be 
some realistic security measures in place in order to swiftly answer the call 
should any unexpected crisis arise.  
 
Though this illustration of the Persian Gulf would not require the sizable 
forces needed in the 1990’s, it would be erroneous to believe that a force 
structure similar to that of the 1970’s would be sufficient to meet the Navy’s 
requirements in the Gulf. The lessons learned from the result of the Nixon era 
cannot be ignored. Minimal Naval forces in the Gulf could not have prevented the 
Islamic Revolution; however, a more significant naval presence could have 
reduced the ability to respond to the crisis. While a constant presence of a CSG 
in a “stable” Gulf could possibly distract from responsibilities elsewhere, frequent 
                                            
37 “National Security Strategy”, p. 29 
38 Donald C.F. Daniel, “The Future of American Naval Power: Propositions and 
Recommendations”, Globalization and Maritime Power, ed by Sam J. Tangredi, Washington D.C., 
National Defense University Press, December 2002, p. 509. 
39 “Naval Operating Concept”, p. 13-14 
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and periodic deployments would assure the Gulf States of America’s commitment 
and interest in the region. The Navy could loosen their tethered mentality, and 
deploy forces periodically.40 This would allow for a greater ability to ‘surge’ to 
other hot-spots around the globe and provide the opportunity for training and 
exercises to improve relations in the gulf and elsewhere. 
 
 
                                            
















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
27 
IV. FUTURE SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF: A WORST-CASE 
SCENARIO 
 
March 26, 2024: 
 
  USS HALSEY is underway in the Northern Persian Gulf to 
observe, and monitor Iran and Iraq, in conjunction with providing 
TBMD to Israel. HALSEY is also providing Air Defense for USS 
New Orleans conducting final withdrawal of U.S. Marines from 
Southern Iraq. Aircraft from USS INDEPENDENCE is providing 
combat air support. This is the last withdraw effort since the terrorist 
bombings of Marine temporary compounds in Iraq.  
  USS REAGAN and USS TRUMAN and their CSG are 
operating in the Central Gulf conducting coordinated strikes on 
terrorist and key regime facilities in Iran and Iraq. USS GEORGIA 
launches a low-yield nuclear cruise missile (bunker buster) on an 
Iranian nuclear bunker in Central Iran, the second such attack in 6 
months.  USS CARTER is operating in the Gulf following a Chinese 
fleet conducting exercises with the Iranian navy.  
  USS THACH is handing over escort duties of four Kuwaiti oil 
tankers to USS JARRETT, before returning to the Northern Gulf. 
Terrorist attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf have crippled many 
western economies as oil prices have skyrocketed. The 
environmental consequences of the attacks on local fishing have 
led to a greater call for U.S. withdrawal from the Gulf. American 
ground forces in the region have been reduced in order to relieve 




The following chapter will present a “worst case” scenario for security in 
the Persian Gulf in 2024. It provides a realistic expectation of what could happen 
under certain sets of assumptions that are contradictory to those posed in the 
previous chapter, which in turn could destabilize and reduce security in the 
region. The stamina and direction of American policy in creating a new Iraqi 
government will have a far-reaching effect on the security of the entire Gulf. An 
increase in the proliferation of Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and a failure 
to make strides regarding the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) could undermine 
the stability of the region. A surge of anti-American sentiment could threaten U.S. 
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national interests and increase domestic pressure on the Gulf States. These 
challenges to the security in the Gulf would require the maintenance of a strong, 
continuous naval presence in the Persian Gulf in order to provide sanctuaries for 
U.S. forces protecting national interests.  
 
B. IRAQ 
The outcome in Iraq will have the greatest potential for disaster for the 
United States. Failure to create a viable government and ensure security within 
Iraq could lead many Iraqis toward Islamic extremists and anti-American groups. 
Breakdown in nation-building efforts could result in an escalation of terrorist 
attacks both in frequency and magnitude.  If a series of terrorist attacks akin to 
the 1983 Marine Corps Barracks bombings in Lebanon occur followed by a 
demand for U.S. withdrawal, departure from Iraq would be seen as a 
demoralizing defeat of American forces. If the U.S. were forced to leave Iraq, it 
would encourage future terrorist attacks and promote extremism throughout the 
region.41  
 
There is more riding on the future of Iraq than security concerns in the 
Persian Gulf. It will also effect future American foreign policy, America’s role in 
the world and American security.42 Just as the ghosts of U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam continue to effect American foreign policy, the American experience with 
Iraq could have a similar effect. Failure in Iraq could lead other countries to be 
more cautious of accepting America’s leadership.  
 
Under “worst case” conditions The Navy must remain continuously 
prepared for crisis to arise in Iraq. It must be prepared to provide support for 
American forces in Iraq to include combat air missions and precision strikes 
against potential terrorist cells. The Navy’s joint mission will also be to contribute 
                                            
41 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Strategic and Grand Strategic Meaning of US Intervention in 
Iraq”, Washington D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 5, 2003, p. 13 
42 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “The United States must be serious about its 
“generational commitments”’, The Weekly Standard; Do What It Takes in Iraq, September 1-
September 8 issue 
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in ISR to Force Commanders on the ground. Another essential mission will be to 
ensure access into Iraq.  Guaranteeing the security of maritime access into Iraq 
will be crucial to American peacetime security operations. The ability to provide a 
means for transportation of resources and material into and out of Iraq is critical 
for progress and economic stability. Finally, the Navy must be positioned to 
provide platforms for possible troop withdrawal or Non-combatant Evacuation 
Operations (NEO) 
 
C. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION  
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of 
radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that 
they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence 
indicates that they are doing so with determination.43 
 
The ease and availability of technology, knowledge and hardware make 
covert procurement an option for political and international legitimacy. Iran is 
estimated to have nuclear capability by 2008; by 2024 they may have the 
missiles capable of striking Eastern Europe.44 The elimination of the Saddam 
Hussein regime in Iraq has been sited as an important lesson for other countries 
in the region contemplating WMD proliferation. However, the case of Iraq could 
have an opposite reaction. OIF showed that no conventional force could hold up 
against the United States. WMD on the other hand could be seen as a balance to 
this threat. “The lesson is to follow India and Pakistan…equip yourself 
clandestinely with weapons that make even the White House think twice before 
attacking”.45  
 
The proliferation dilemma could continue to spiral if the United States 
introduces small-scale, low-yield nuclear weapons (known as ‘bunker busters’) 
into the region. These weapons, used to destroy deep, hardened bunkers could 
                                            
43 “National Security Strategy”  
44  Rowan Scarborough, “Rumsfeld Targets ‘Future Threats’”, Washington Times, February 
25, 2004 
45 Ian Williams, “The Law of Unintended Consequences: Will the War in Iraq Spur 
Proliferation?”, Foreign Policy In Focus, April 14, 2003 
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force proliferators to further disperse their WMD sites and bury them deeper. A 
policy advocating use of any kind of nuclear weapons, except in response to a 
nuclear attack, will undermine nonproliferation efforts by suggesting to other 
states that nuclear weapons are legitimate and necessary tools that can achieve 
military or political objectives. If implemented, this policy only increases the odds 
that another county or group will race to acquire these terrible weapons.46  Use 
of American weapons mass destruction could lead to retaliation “in kind” and 
result in WMD attacks on American’s and American interests. 
 
The Navy will continue to play a vital role to detect and destroy potential 
WMD threats en route to their targets47.  A critical role will be the capability to 
protect the region under a Ballistic Missile Defense shield. Naval vessels will 
provide crucial initial detection of missiles from Iran toward Israel, or other Gulf 
allies. The Navy’s TBMD capability will be a key to further Cooperative Defense 
Initiatives (CDI) with GCC countries for their defense and the defense of 
American interests in the region.48   
 
The Navy will also provide platforms to conduct precision strikes to 
eliminate WMD facilities. These missions will allow for the entire spectrum of 
weapons to be available to combat WMD including low-yield nuclear missiles to 
penetrate hardened bunkers. These will incorporate carrier-based aircraft, as well 
as cruise missiles from surface or subsurface platforms.  
 
D. GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 
Terrorist attacks could rise in both frequency and magnitude to possibly 
include Weapons of Mass Destruction. A 1999 DIA report claims “it is probable 
that terrorist organizations or individuals will employ a weapon of mass 
                                            
46 “New Nuclear Policies, New Weapons, New Dangers”, Arms Control Association Fact 
sheet, April 2003 
47 “National Strategy To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction”, December 2002, p. 3 
48 Kenneth Katsman, “The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003”, Report for Congress, 
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destruction against U.S. interests by 2020. These interests could include U.S. 
forces, regimes supporting or aiding America, or oil producing facilities and 
tankers. While any attack would be harmful, a threat to the transportation of oil 
from the Persian Gulf could have catastrophic effects on a global scale.  
 
Another possibility is that future terrorist organizations could become more 
interconnected and structured. Such a union could integrate extremist groups 
currently splintered groups and coalesce fringe extremists into a truly “global” 
terrorist network. However, “Terrorism should not cause the United States to 
abandon its security interests and commitments in the region, but Al Qaeda’s 
focus on the U.S. presence in the Gulf underscores the need for Washington to 
adjust its profile over time and thus deny this target to those groups seeking to 
harm U.S. interests” 49 The need to reduce the American “footprint” in the Gulf 
could in turn reduce the opportunity for terrorist attacks against American troops. 
 
The presence of the U.S. Navy is essential in this situation. Remote 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) operated from sea could provide real-time 
intelligence and targeting information for counter-terrorist strikes. Armed UAV’s 
and cruise missiles could loiter in the vicinity of a target until final intelligence 
sources confirm their locations. A key component of the Global War on Terrorism 
is an ability to quickly strike targets with an element of surprise. Though the dots 
have been connected to enable long-range aircraft to strike targets in the Gulf, 
the U.S. footprint is still sizeable in Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Terrorist attacks 
on these bases could paralyze ground forces. Aircraft launched from forward 
airbases could forewarn potential targets of an imminent attack. Carrier based 
aircraft and missiles can be launched at targets without permission from host 
nations and provide for a level of surprise no found from ground forces.  
 
 
                                            
49 Joseph McMillian, Richard Sokolsky, and Andrew C. Winner, “Toward a New Regional 
Security Architecture”, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, The Washington Quarterly 26:3 (Summer 2003), p. 163 
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E. U.S. IDENTITY IN THE GULF  
Finally, the further deterioration of U.S. prestige in the Gulf coupled with 
strong Islamist rhetoric could create a true “Clash of Civilizations” as envisioned 
by Samuel Huntington.50 Failure to create a stable, “democratic” government 
could reinforce resentment and image of the United States as a colonial power. 
Extremists characterize American land-based forces as ‘crusaders’ conjuring up 
images of Christian knights occupying Muslim Holy lands during the Middle 
Ages.51 Continue with “next step” threats could further push Muslims away from 
the West and toward Islamic extremists. It could also build on the perception of 
American interference and sight American troops as a demonstration of 
American imperialism. “US rhetoric and moral posturing has so far had a largely 
destructive impact… And all Arab states, at least partially, fear that the U.S. may 
have broader regional ambitions”52  
 
With a growing swell of anti-American sentiment in the Gulf, ground forces 
deployed in the region become more of a target for Islamic extremist rhetoric and 
terrorist attacks. If the United States cannot work with regional powers to reduce 
the terrorist threat and holds the entire Arab region accountable for terrorist 
attacks, terrorist activists will fester and gain further momentum. Failure to curb 
terrorism could portray the United States as weak and unable to maintain 
security.  
 
A further division of Arab-US relationship could cripple efforts to create 
regional security.53 The U.S. will look for other means of maintaining security in 
the Gulf, by increasing the “over-the-horizon” presence offered by the Navy.  
                                            
50 See Samuel Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations” (Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993) for future 
conflict division over cultural/religious lines,  
51  Roger Cliff, Sam J. Tangredi, and Christine E. Wormuth, “The Future of U.S. Overseas 
Presence”, QDR 2001; Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, ed by Michele A. 
Flournoy, p. 248 
52 Anthony H. Cordesman, “US Strategy in the Middle East: The Gap Between Strategic 




These forces will also be seen as a burden to the countries that host them 
as extremists look to target the regimes supporting the United States. The ability 
to access bases in Gulf countries will not always be guaranteed. Neutral states 
and even a few allies have been reluctant to grant the U.S. military unrestricted 
access to facilities or over flight rights at various points during the War on terror 
and during preparations for a potential invasion of Iraq. More of the same can be 
expected in the future. As a result the United States may increasingly rely on 
sea-based forces to conduct strike operations and support ground forces.  
 
F. CONCLUSION: NAVAL RESPONSE 
The scenario proposed above would intensify the need for Naval Forces in 
the Persian Gulf to provide improved freedom of action and better protection for 
friendly forces referred to in Joint Vision 2020.54 A priority for naval forces will be 
to assure access to key facilities and ensure the continuous flow of oil through 
the Gulf. As in the mid-1980’s, naval vessels would be required to escort oil 
tanker through the Gulf to protect shipping from terrorist Protection from the 
threat from small boat attach could be accomplished with small combatant 
vessels (LCS or FFG), however, larger combatants (CG or DDG) would also be 
required to deter/defend against possible ASCM attacks. These larger 
combatants would also be required to conduct TBMD missions, monitoring Iran 
and Iraq for potential missile launches against U.S. interests.  
 
The Navy would also need to use power projection capabilities in order to 
conduct coordinated strikes on terrorist camps and infrastructure and also WMD 
facilities in the region. Carriers and TLAM platforms in the region would be 
essential for this mission due to an increase in threats to ground forces and 
pressure from host nations. The Navy would also provide autonomous platforms 
should the U.S. decide to deploy/employ low-yield nuclear weapons in the region 
against hardened WMD targets.  
                                            
54 See “Joint Vision 2020”, Washington D.C., US Government Printing Office, June 2000, for 
more information on Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff guidance for the military Joint Operations 
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The scope of these missions would require a presence that would be 
difficult to sustain the material readiness of ships and personnel. The focus of the 
navy would require numerous carriers to deploy into the region and continuously 
maintain station. Such a presence would drastically reduce the availability of 
maintenance and increase in the deterioration of the fleet. It would also restrict 
the Navy’s ability to surge to other “hot-spots” around the globe and stretch 




 V. CONCLUSION 
In 2020, the nation will face a wide range of interests, 
opportunities and challenges and will require a military that can 
both win wars and contribute to peace. The global interests and 
responsibilities of the United States will endure, and there is no 
indication that threats to those interests and responsibilities or to 
our allies, will disappear. The strategic concepts of decisive force, 
power projection, overseas presence, and strategic agility will 
continue to govern our efforts to fulfill those responsibilities and 
meet the challenges of the future. 55 
 
While it is difficult to overstate the importance of America’s national 
interests in the Persian Gulf, the means to secure these interests is often argued. 
The Navy’s recent policy of “Fleet Response Plan”, calls for multiple Carrier 
Strike Groups to rapidly response to crisis anywhere in the world, including the 
Persian Gulf, at a moments notice. Forces need to be available to surge into a 
region at the call of the President in respond to international crises. The ability to 
surge forces into a region has led some to believe that sustained presence in the 
Persian Gulf is no longer necessary. In analyzing the recent historical naval 
presence in the Persian Gulf a number of conclusions can be made as to where 
the Navy may go in the future. 
 
A. A CASE FOR “MINIMAL PRESENCE” 
The minimal deployment model of the 1970’s may be a viable answer for 
those who question the necessity of forward-deployed naval units in the Persian 
Gulf. Proponents look toward the 1970’s for an example of naval force structure 
to provide security in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. can no longer afford to send 
troops on routine deployments. With the air bases in Diego Garcia and Qatar, the 
dots have been connected to allow seemingly unlimited access to the Persian 
Gulf. The Air Force is more than capable of launching strikes in response to 
intelligence against terrorists from any number of bases either abroad or at 
                                            
55 “Joint Vision 2020”, p. 1 
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home. The Navy no longer holds the monopoly on forward strike capabilities. 
This, coupled with the vanishing of former missions of carrier-based aircraft, 
Operation Southern Watch and UN sanction enforcement, aircraft carriers may 
no longer be necessary in the Gulf. Finally, the burden of routine deployments 
detracts from our ability to maintain a high level of readiness of multiple forces.  
 
This model will provide naval forces necessary under a ‘best-case’ 
scenario; however, this option leaves significant gaps regarding short and long-
term naval commitments. Token naval forces would only provide minimal 
capabilities to carry out missions to support the Global War on Terrorism. They 
will also need to assure access to Iraq’s national resources in order to ensure 
Iraq’s economic stability. Finally the Navy must provide forces to reassure Iraq 
and other countries of America’s resolve for the stability of Iraq and the Persian 
Gulf. Ultimately, minimal forces would not provide significant force required for 
possible unexpected crises in the region.  
 
B. A CASE FOR “PERIODIC PRESENCE” 
Another course of action for naval forces could be modeled after the naval 
structure in the 1980’s with a modest surface presence coupled with sustained 
carrier presence in the Indian Ocean with periodic excursions and the ability to 
surge into the Gulf. These forces will be called upon to deliver an overwhelming 
force to fight the War on Terrorism, and to deter nations from continuing their 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The reduction of forces could calm 
anti-American rhetoric. Greater reliance on “Jointness” will place emphasis on all 
forward deployed forces for the security in the Gulf and make use of basing 
agreements in the Gulf.  
 
While naval missions of the post-gulf war are gone, there still remains a 
necessary requirement for carrier forward deployed presence in the Gulf. The fall 
of the Iraqi regime does not mean there is no longer a need for Naval forces in 
the Northern Gulf.  Naval forces will be required to provide joint support for Iraq 
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and the Global War on Terrorism.  Routine port visits can reinforce security for 
regional allies, without drawing the negative political perception that forward 
bases have on host regimes.  The visual presence of Naval forces not only 
symbolizes American power, but assures allies and adversaries that the United 
States is prepared to protect its interests and meet security challenges should a 
crisis arise. Furthermore, naval forces must be present to deal with any 
unexpected attack that could result in significant losses before surge forces 
arrive.56  
 
C. A CASE FOR “CONTINUOUS PRESENCE” 
In the spectrum between the posed “best” and “worst-case” scenarios, the 
most probable scenario resembles something closer to the later and historical 
analysis of the region indicates a high probability of an unexpected event 
effecting security in the Gulf in the foreseeable future. The model that provides 
the best solution for future scenarios will be naval presence similar to that of the 
1990’s with a continual carrier presence in the Gulf. The threats of WMD 
proliferation and technological advancement continue to endanger U.S. interests.  
While the presence of the U.S. Navy has not been characterized as a viable 
deterrence to nuclear proliferation, the Navy will continue to play in important role 
in threat reduction and defense. The Navy’s missions as delineated in Sea Power 
21 are to provide the capabilities to project power ashore (Sea Strike) and to 
defend American interests from missile attack (Sea Shield)57. Regarding counter-
proliferation, naval forces afford commanders the ability to strike WMD facilities 
by whatever means necessary from a variety of platforms. Surface Naval forces 
will also provide Regional Ballistic Missile Defense and ensure regional security 
from possible missile attack. 
 
                                            
56 Richard L. Kugler, “Naval Overseas Presence in the New U.S. Defense Strategy”, 
Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. by Sam J. Tangredi, Washington D.C., National Defense 
University Press, December 2002, p. 289 
57 Admiral Vern Clark, “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities” Proceedings, 
October 2002 
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The Global War on Terrorism requires a constant, capable presence with 
the ability and flexibility to strike at a moments notice. The sovereignty of U.S. 
carriers allows them to work under complete autonomy in international waters. 
Aircraft can be launched at targets without worrying about host country intentions 
and permission. Land based aircraft loose the element of surprise needed to 
strike terrorist targets of opportunity. The overt nature of land-based launches 
could trigger terrorist cells of an upcoming attack. Operations conducted from a 
carrier are carried out with little knowledge from the surrounding countries and do 
not compromise the element of surprise.   
 
With the growing anti-American sentiment across the world, American 
troops on the ground are becoming a political liability in both the international and 
domestic realms. Naval deployments to the Gulf can provide military might 
without the drastic footprint that other forces rely on.  The carrier presence in the 
Gulf is the best way to ensure the security of our allies in the region without 
adding the domestic pressures from having troops on the ground. “Our key 
enabler is our persistence, our ability to remain on station indefinitely without the 
need for outside logistics support.”58 
 
D. RECOMENDATION 
 The Fleet Response Plan has raised new questions regarding forward 
presence and traditional navy roles and deployment cycles. America is the 
undisputed heavyweight in the world, and the Persian Gulf. As evidence in 
Operation Iraqi freedom, the U.S. does not need permission from the 
international community to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf. “The global 
environment and our defense strategy call for a military with the ability to respond 
swiftly to a broad range of scenarios and defend the vital interests of the United 
States”.59  
 
                                            
58 Rear Admiral Mark Edwards, “Presence with a Purpose: surface Navy shields forces 
afloat, ashore”, Armed Forces Journal, March 2004  
59 Clark, “Sea Power 21” 
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Yet, in order to pursue these interest the U.S. must also seek the fine line 
between providing security and becoming the threat. The overt nature of ground 
forces often pose dangers for host countries facing extremist opposition. Gulf 
States will only allow the presence of forces on their soil until they become a 
threat to the regimes legitimacy. Ground forces also provide stationary targets for 
potential terrorists.  
   
The Navy’s role has evolved over the last 30 years, but its basic purpose 
endures: project power over land and sea in support of national objectives and 
provide unfettered access to all parts of the globe.60 The United States must 
continue to maintain persistent power projection forces in the Middle East. The 
best way to protect those interests is by maintaining a constant carrier presence 
in the Gulf while maintaining the ability to surge forces to respond to crises. FRP 
promotes “deploying with a purpose”, then the purpose to deploy to the Persian 
Gulf is clear: Iraq, Iran’s WMD, GWOT. These along with the unpredictability of 
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